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Global Crisis

WEATHERING COVID-19:
Lessons from Wuhan and
Milan for Urban Governance
and Sustainability
BY XIANGMING CHEN AND YI TERESA WU

The global spread of COVID-19
has exposed the world’s largest and
densest urban centres to bearing
the brunt of this pandemic. The
invisible virus has forced thriving
metropolises to empty their streets
and shops to dead spaces absent of
people and activity. It even triggers
the doomsday question of, “Does
COVID-19 mean the end of cities?”
In this article, we compare how two

great cities of the East and West –
Wuhan and Milan – have responded
to the deadly virus, with their
internal and external strengths and
constraints. We also take the reader
deep into the two cities’ neighbourhoods for a realistic sense of how
their local residents have dealt with
COVID-19. We end by drawing critical lessons for urban governance
and sustainability.

Featured photo above: The empty plaza in front of Duomo di Milano, Italy

O

ver the first few months of
2020, the novel coronavirus,
which erupted in the Chinese
city of Wuhan around 1 January,
engulfed around 200 countries and
regions, infected over 12 million people
and killed over 550,000 as of 8 July.
This rapid spread from one locality to
the entire world has quickly mobilised
our responses to fighting COVID-19.
Little collective response, however, has
taken place, leaving most nations to
muster their own resources to stem the
virus within their closed borders. This
has facilitated comparing nation-based
data on new cases, death counts and
relative performances in containing the
virus. However, it has overshadowed a
local focus on responses to COVID-19,
especially by the most affected cities.

The invisible virus has forced
thriving metropolises to
empty their streets and shops
to dead spaces absent of
people and activity.
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While global in scope, COVID-19 has hit
cities very differently. As the first epicentre of the
pandemic, Wuhan lost 3,869 residents, about 80%
of China’s total COVID-19 deaths. New York
City, the epicentre of the pandemic in the United
States, has accounted for almost one-quarter of
all deaths in the country. Since the coronavirus
spreads faster in closer social and spatial interactions, is density to blame for the high death counts
in Wuhan and New York, whose urban cores
have around 7,000 and 11,000 people per km2,
respectively? Not so fast. Despite a density of
over 20,000 people per km2 in central Shanghai,
the city of 25 million people had only 339
COVID cases and seven deaths. Other factors
must be considered and can reveal a lot about
cities’ capacities to respond to an unprecedented
public health crisis and to enhance post-crisis
governance and sustainability.
To probe into these factors, we conduct a
comparative analysis of two COVID-19 epicentres – Wuhan and Milan. The first section looks
at the trends in COVID-19 infections and deaths
in the two cities in global and regional contexts.
The second section examines municipal and
community responses to COVID-19 in terms
of containment strategy, medical infrastructure
and external support versus constraint. The
last section draws important lessons for urban
governance and sustainability.
1. Seeing Through the Data
COVID-19 has generated a deluge of data on
infection and death in real time. We contextualise city-level data on Wuhan and Milan through
a statistical look at China and Italy in the global
picture of COVID-19 and the domestic regional
contexts of the two cities.
A Global Glance
China and Italy have been among the world’s
most COVID-affected countries. But they have
very different trajectories in the virus’s spread,
containment and destruction compared with
other most-affected countries. China led the
world in active cases and deaths from early
January until late March. During that period,
China and Iran were the only two developing
and non-Western countries among the top 10
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A deserted highway near
the Huanghelou tourist
site at night.
Source: Photo from
Xinhua; accessed from
www.chinadailyhk.com/
article/124842

China and Italy
have been among
the world’s most
COVID-affected
countries. But they
have very different
trajectories in the
virus’s spread,
containment
and destruction
compared with
other mostaffected countries.

countries ranked by total coronavirus cases.
After Wuhan’s lockdown on 23 January, China
peaked at 4,670 cases on 12 February, and
around 80,000 cases on 1 March.1 These dates
marked a sharp decline in new cases and slight
increases in cases mostly due to imported cases.
Italy had few cases when China’s new cases
peaked on 12 February. Despite a regional-to-national quarantine on 8 March, Italy’s
4,825 deaths surpassed China’s total number of
deaths (4,632 on 17 April)2 on 21 March. Italy’s
cases reached 86,500 on 27 March and surpassed
China’s highest number of around 83,000 on 1
May. In comparison, the United States topped
100,000 cases on 27 March and surpassed Italy
in the number of deaths at 5,151 on 31 March.
The US, Italy and several developed European
countries remained among the world’s top 10
most-affected nations through April. Turkey
and Russia joined the list at the end of April,
as did Brazil in early May. At this point, China
was no longer in the initial top 10 countries. As
of early July, increased infections in more developing countries like Pakistan, Peru and South
Africa had pushed Italy out of the top 10 and
China out of the top 20.
A Regional Perspective
To further frame the Wuhan-Milan comparison,
we highlight the regional settings in which the two

Lombardy, Italy’s wealthiest
region in the north, was
the regional epicentre of
the pandemic for Italy
earlier during the outbreak.

regional epicentre. Some 40,000 people travelled from
Bergamo and Spain to a Champions’ League football game in Milan on 19 February 2020, of whom
many partied overnight, accelerating the spread of
COVID-19 in the region.4 The Milan Fashion Week
of 18-24 February also drew its usual large attendance. These large social gatherings, coupled with
geographical proximity of Milan and smaller nearby
cities, contributed to the virus’s spread in Lombardy.

cities have been affected disproportionately. Hubei
province, with Wuhan as its capital, is the regional
epicentre of COVID-19 in China. When the infected
cases in Hubei peaked at nearly 5,000 on 25 February
(see Figure 1A), they accounted for 83.3% of all of
China’s cases. This percentage remained more or less
the same until 6 May, after China brought the virus
under control. While Wuhan consistently accounted
for the majority of cases in the province, at 73.9%
on 6 May, it was not an isolated epicentre. As of
6 May, four out of 17 cities in Hubei had accumulated 9,399 cases, which accounted for 13.8% of
all cases in Hubei.3 The four cities border Wuhan
on all sides. Not only did Wuhan have Hubei province as the outer layer of its COVID cases, it also
spread the virus around its surrounding areas.
Lombardy, Italy’s wealthiest region in the north,
was the regional epicentre of the pandemic for Italy
earlier during the outbreak. We see this through
a combined analysis of the national data from
Worldometer and the subnational data reported
by the Italian Ministry of Health (see Figure 1B).
Given the absence of official data for February, we
have picked three points in time to trace the trajectory of COVID-19 in Lombardy from early March.
When Italy had only 2,502 cases on 3 March, 1,520
(60.8%) were concentrated in the Lombardy region.
This share dropped to 39.7% on 3 April, and to
36.8% on 3 May. Lombardy was hardest hit earlier
on, before the virus spread to other parts of Italy.
Lombardy differs drastically from China, where
Hubei and Wuhan remained the regional and local
epicentres throughout the pandemic. Lombardy’s
epicentre over time, Milan’s share of Lombardy’s
cases rose from 7.4% on 3 March to 21.9% on 3
April, and to 25.9% on 3 May. Similar to the virus
connection between Wuhan and its surrounding
cities, the city of Bergamo, 50 km from Milan city on
the edge of Greater Milan, was an integral part of the

A Local Comparative Focus
Hubei and Lombardy help us focus on Wuhan and
Milan as urban epicentres where COVID-19 has
inflicted the worst destruction and has been tackled
most forcefully with local and non-local policy
tools and medical resources. Figure 2 compares
COVID-19 trends for both cities, even though the
Figure 1A: COVID-19 Trends in Hubei Province
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Source: Graphed from data reported by Hubei Provincial Sanitary and
Health Commission.

Figure 1B: COVID-19 Trends in the Lombardy Region
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Source: Graphed from data reported by Italy’s Ministry of Health.
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data on Milan are limited to just one indicator.
Wuhan experienced a spike in new cases early,
pushing up both active and total cases, which then
diverged sharply. Wuhan’s active cases dropped
dramatically as the pandemic was brought under
control, while total cases flattened out. Although
coronavirus hit Milan later, its total cases grew
continuously. Lurking behind these trends is
the critical measure of case fatality for both
cities. Wuhan’s case fatality rate peaked at 6.6%,
the highest in China, on 16 April when China
adjusted the data on Wuhan upward, although
it was still seen as lower than expected outside
China. Given the absence of death counts for
Milan, we estimate the city’s case fatality rate
to be around 15% around 16 April based on
its total cases relative to Lombardy’s and the
midpoint between the death rates for Lombardy
vs Italy. This large differential between the two
cities’ case fatality rates anticipates a focal analysis and explanation later.
More people outside China are likely to
have heard of Milan than of Wuhan, certainly
before COVID-19. Wuhan, however, has carried
the moniker of “the Chicago of China” since
around 1900, when an American journalist
visiting the city labelled it as such for its location by major lakes, heavy industries and hub
status for rail transportation.5 Wuhan has also
preserved a small Concessions area by the
Yangtze River that was built by European colonialists and adventurers who had sailed up the
river from Shanghai in the early 20th century.
While Milan serves as Italy’s top financial centre
and one of Europe’s top fashion centres today, it
has been a major industrial centre since around
1800, albeit on a smaller scale today.
Other indicators in Table 1 show the two
cities’ similarities and comparisons of their
varied responses to COVID-19. Wuhan’s urban
core and Milan’s (contiguous) urban area were
comparable in population, and so were Wuhan
and Greater Milan, counting Wuhan’s population according to household registration. One
of densest cities in Italy and Europe, Milan’s
density was similar to Wuhan’s urban core. While
Wuhan and Milan have different economic
sectors, they are among China’s and Italy’s top
economic centres. The two cities share a mixture
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Figure 2: COVID-19 Trends in Wuhan and Milan
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Sources: Graphed from data reported by the Health Commission of Wuhan and Italy’s Ministry of Health.
Note: There was only data on infected cases for Milan.

Table 1: Comparative Indicators on Wuhan and Milan (Lombardy)
Indicators

Wuhan

Milan

Notes

1. Population:
1.1 Urban core
(seven districts)
1.2 Outer districts
(six districts)

10,892,900 (8,536,516)
6,655,800 (4,941,769)
4,237,100 (3,594,749)

1,378,689 (City)
3,250,315 (Metropolitan city)
5,270,000 (contiguous
Urban area)
8,220,170 (Greater Milan)

2017 data for
Wuhan; people with
household
registration in
brackets; 2015-2018
data for Milan

2. Density (average)
2.1 Urban core
2.1 Outer districts

1,271 per km2
6,969 per km2
557 per km2

7,315 per km2 (City)
2,029 per km2
(Metropolitan city)
2,783 per km2 (Urban area)
420 per km2 (Lombardy)

017 data for Wuhan;
people with
household
registration in
brackets; 2015-2018
data for Milan

3. Economic importance

- GDP ranked 9ᵗʰ among
the top 10 Chinese cities;
- A major manufacturing
center (auto, steel, IT)

- Second largest GDP
among EU cities;
- 10% of Italy’s GDP;
- 20% of Italy’s GDP;
- Italy’s top economic,
financial, fashion and
media center

3.59

2.00 (Milan, Lombardy)

7.38

8.00 (Lombardy)

3.57
4.91

3.85
5.25

5. Location

Central China

Northern Italy

6. Ecology

River/lake city

River/lake city

7. Administrative
composition

13 districts (7 urban core,
6 outer districts)

Nine administrative Borough
Councils (Milan City)

8. Administrative status

Capital city of
Hubei province

Capital city of
Lombardy Region

9. Transport importance

China’s largest hub for rail,
air, land and water
transportation
(busiest national rail hub
with three stations)

One of Italy’s most
important rail hubs,
with five stations

4. Medical infrastructure
4.1 Hospitals/100,000
people
4.2 Hospital
beds/1,000 people
4.3 Doctors/1,000
4.4 Nurses/1,000

Source: Computed and compiled from Wuhan city and health statistical yearbooks, OECD,
Wikipedia, and other online sources.

- Milan
- (Lombardy)

2018 data on
Wuhan;
2017 data on
doctors & nurses
(Italy as a whole)

of different and similar indicators on medical infrastructure. Wuhan and Milan have a similar location
relative to major rivers, political status as capitals of
their respective regions, and as national transport
hubs, especially for rail. While some similarities may
lead us to expect similar local responses to COVID19, they alert us to different factors that matter to the
two cities’ different responses to the coronavirus.
2. Factors That Really Matter
Diverse conditions at the municipal level and
beyond mediate COVID-19’s local impacts and
responses. The relationship between the pandemic
and local responses reveals a lot about cities’ capacities to manage a major crisis.
Governmental Response as a Difference-maker
The origin of COVID-19, Wuhan quickly became
China’s and the world’s epicentre before the virus
spread far and wide and turned Milan and New
York into their countries’ epicentres. In early
January, there was confusion in Wuhan about the
nature, spread and impact of the coronavirus. It not
only led to an initial delay in governmental response
but also to a lack of transparency and information-sharing as perceived by the outside world. As
the virus began to spread locally and regionally,
the Chinese government locked down Wuhan on
23 January when the city of 11 million people had
around 500 confirmed cases, which accounted for
half of the world’s cases at the time. The lockdown
was very soon extended to 15 other cities in Hubei,
affecting 35 million people. By 14 February, four
other provinces and 48 cities had issued lockdown
policies that affected around 500 million people.6
Under lockdown, people were not allowed to
leave Wuhan and a few worst-affected Hubei cities,
where all public transport systems were shut down,

Piazza della
Loggia in Brescia,
Lombardy during
coronavirus
lockdown.

While Wuhan and Milan have
different economic sectors, they
are among China’s and Italy’s top
economic centres. The two cities
share a mixture of different and similar
indicators on medical infrastructure.

while Shanghai and Beijing only restricted movement among communities and neighbourhoods.
Since the lockdown began right before the Chinese
New Year, the year’s busiest travel period, about five
million residents, including many migrant workers,
had left Wuhan for the holiday prior to the lockdown.
Wuhan also had around three million short-term
residents, mostly migrant workers, not included in
Table 1. This means the lockdown kept around nine
million people in place. As China’s busiest rail hub,
Wuhan’s three rail stations normally see around 150
million trips through annually, with the heaviest
traffic before the Chinese New Year holidays. The
lockdown sealed off the largest channel of transmission through mass mobility between Wuhan and
the outside world. Halting any movement out of
Wuhan ironically went a long way in preventing the
virus from ravaging other parts of China.
Unlike Wuhan, Milan had a gradual and phased
response. After the confirmation of 14 cases in
Lombardy on 21 February (Figure 1B), Milan and
10 other cities in northern Italy were put under
quarantine requiring social distancing and sheltering
at home. On 25 February, the quarantine expanded
to school closures and teleworking for Lombardy
and other northern regions, creating a vast “Red
Zone”. These quarantine measures were extended
to all Italian regions the next day. On 8 March, Italy’s
Minister of Health issued a new decree extending
most restrictive measures to the Lombardy region
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The total lockdown of Wuhan (and Hubei)
stopped the spread quickly, while the phased
quarantine in Milan (and Lombardy) was less
effective in containing the virus for some time.
and other provinces in central-northern Italy, which
put 16 million people under quarantine. Taking
advantage of lax enforcement, a growing number
of people left the north for southern Italy to flee the
virus, spreading transmission to other largely unaffected regions. In response, the government adopted
a new “staying at home” decree on 11 March to
implement true quarantine. It was followed by a ban
on all non-essential activities on 21 March. People
who went out without a legitimate reason would
be fined up to €4,000. Despite these incremental
efforts to contain the virus, they left enough openings and loopholes for continued transmission
within and beyond Milan and Lombardy until
COVID-19 reached all corners of Italy, which
became the world’s No. 2 in cases behind the US
by early May.
The total lockdown of Wuhan (and Hubei)
stopped the spread quickly, while the phased quarantine in Milan (and Lombardy) was less effective
in containing the virus for some time. The lockdown of Wuhan came so suddenly on 23 January
that some local residents did not know about it until
their relatives outside China informed them via the
Chinese messaging app WeChat.7 The lockdown
shut down Wuhan’s highways, railways and intra-city
public transport systems. It imposed curfews on
communities and allowed people to enter and exit
only at particular times. And all government-owned
national, provincial and local TV stations conveyed
a consistently strong message about the lockdown’s
necessity and benefits. In Milan, residents were
initially misled by the public information that they
could continue their normal life after the initial
set of cases and that masks were useless and they
should just wash their hands. “It took Italian people
a long time to realise the seriousness of this emergency because of the slow government response
and incorrect media promotion.”8 The differentially
effective responses reflect the differences in governance capacity that play into other key factors.
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Making the Medical Infrastructure Work
To contain and suppress COVID-19 in a pandemic
epicentre, local medical infrastructure must work
effectively under extraordinary pressure. An integral
part of the municipal service apparatus, healthcare
facilities depend in quantity and quality on sustained
investment and enhancement by local governments,
with supplementary support from higher-level
authorities. Lombardy has the best healthcare
system in Italy. It was even regarded as the second
most-efficient in the world, illustrated by a promotional brochure featuring the line, “Be healthy,
come to Lombardy.”9 While we expected Milan’s
medical infrastructure to be superior to Wuhan’s
due to Italy’s generally more advanced economy,
Table 1 shows comparable indicators which, except
for hospital availability, favour Wuhan. Yet the two
cities’ medical responses to the coronavirus have
gone far beyond a few indicators on local medical
infrastructure.
Wuhan had 4,639 healthcare facilities in 2018, only
398 of which were hospitals, which translated into
3.59 hospitals per 100,000 people (Table 1). The surge
of cases from late January to mid-February overwhelmed the local hospitals, most of which were not
equipped to handle COVID patients. The accelerated
transmission occurred as a result of large numbers
of people who rushed to hospitals but were told to
quarantine at home, which in turn spread the virus
within families and around neighbourhoods. The
4,241 community medical centres, neighbourhood
clinics and other small facilities were of little use to
combat this vicious virus. The national government
stepped up into this fight. By 6 February, the national
government built two new hospitals in Wuhan in less
than 10 days to relieve the strained local hospitals.

Moreover, the municipal government
built 16 Fangcang shelter hospitals.
Rapidly converted from existing public
venues such as exhibition centres and
stadiums, these large, makeshift healthcare centres isolated COVID patients
with mild to moderate symptoms from
their families and communities and
provided them with basic medical care,
food, activities and shelter.10 These
hospitals treated 12,000 patients, one out
of every four patients in Wuhan. They
lightened the burden on designated
hospitals for acute patients where ICU
beds had already been occupied.
In the early days of the pandemic,
the national government sent over
42,000 generally younger medical
workers from across the country,
including military medical personnel,
to Wuhan and other affected cities in
Hubei province.11 This mobilisation of
national medical resources was critical
in containing the virus locally by halting
the spiral of deaths, taking the infected
from homes and helping them recover.
This was reflected in the rapid drop in
new cases and the noticeable decline in
active cases around 18 February (see
Figure 2). On 1 March, all the patients at
one Fangcang hospital were discharged.
By then, 7,255 of the 13,467 beds at 16
Fangcang hospitals had become available. Of the 26,911 beds at designated
COVID hospitals, 6,704 were unoccupied.12 On 10 March, all Fangcang
hospitals were retired, including the
one converted from the city’s largest
convention centre. By mid-March,
3,000 members of 21 medical teams
left Wuhan for their home cities and
provinces.13 Wuhan’s own medical
infrastructure would not have been
able to withstand the marauding virus
without an unprecedented infusion of
extra-local medical assistance. It literally
broke the curve of the outbreak.
Unprepared to deal with a surge in
COVID-19 patients early on, hospitals

Patients infected with the coronavirus take rest at
a temporary hospital converted from Wuhan Sports
Center in Wuhan in central China’s Hubei Province

in Milan and Lombardy quickly became
overburdened by early March. This
was not unexpected, given the lesser
hospital capacity adjusted for the
populations of Milan and Lombardy
(see Table 1). Unlike Wuhan, Milan
could not expect or count on massive
assistance from the national government, due to Lombardy’s considerable
regional autonomy and most-wealthy
status among all Italian regions. In
the period up to 10 March, a growing
number of infected people arrived
at hospitals in Milan and the broader
region, with some barely able to breathe

To contain and
suppress COVID-19 in
a pandemic epicentre,
local medical
infrastructure must
work effectively
under extraordinary
pressure.

upon arrival. Of Lombardy’s 737 ICU
beds available for COVID patients,
more than 600 were filled. At a major
hospital in Milan, half of the beds were
dedicated to treating COVID patients.
Rushing to add ICU beds, Lombardy’s
health chief talked about adding 500
ICU beds at Milan’s expo centre.14 In
Lombardy, 20-30% of the medical
personnel were infected and some of
them took up ICU beds. By 25 March,
40 Italian doctors had died from the
virus, most of them in Lombardy.15
The Italian government tried to rush
10,000 medical school students into
service before graduation. Insufficient
hospital beds and doctors forced some
sick patients to return home, which
contributed to a very high case fatality
rate of 8.5%, twice as high as elsewhere
in Italy.16 This was even higher than
Wuhan’s highest rate of 7.7%, reached
on 16 April when the Chinese government adjusted the death count upward
by 50%. By then, Italy’s case fatality
rate was in the double digits and led all
countries at 14% up to mid-May. With
the world’s second-oldest population,
after only Japan, Italy suffered a disproportionately high fatality rate among its
elderly, with 41% and 35% of all deaths
in the 80-89 and 70-79 age groups.17
Given the comparable indicators
on available hospital beds and doctors
relative to the populations of Wuhan
vs Milan (Table 1), why did the former
fare better in hospitalising and caring
for COVID patients? It is tempting
to attribute this mainly to the rapid
construction of dedicated new hospitals, the creation of Fangcang hospitals
and deployment of outside doctors and
nurses in Wuhan. A more important
difference resides inside Italy’s national
and regional healthcare systems in dealing
with a severe pandemic. Under Italy’s
decentralised regional healthcare since
the 1990s, private hospitals have done
better than public hospitals by taking

Source: Photo by Xiao Yijiu/Xinhua via AP, News Channel 8, Tampa, Florida, February 18, 2020; accessed from https://
www.wfla.com/community/health/coronavirus/virus-claims-life-of-wuhan-hospital-director-as-death-toll-nears-2000/.
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The success of lockdowns and quarantines in halting or reducing
mobility and creating and sustaining social distancing depends on
reactions from communities and residents. Top-down containment
won’t work well without bottom-up cooperation.
both insured and paying patients. The public hospitals lost around 25,000 beds during 1995-2018. The
competition has forced public hospitals to upgrade
themselves at the expense of community care facilities and services. During the pandemic, Lombardy’s
underfunded community healthcare services could do
little for rapidly growing infections as COVID patients
rushed to public hospitals and overwhelmed them.18
Community health centres and clinics in Wuhan,
which accounted for the majority of its medical facilities, also helped little in containing the virus.
Communal and Individual Responses
The success of lockdowns and quarantines in
halting or reducing mobility and creating and
sustaining social distancing depends on reactions
from communities and residents. Community
support for individual physical and mental health
and individual adaptation during lockdowns and
quarantines are critical to how effective medical
infrastructure can be in isolating patients from
homes, containing viral transmission and mitigating death rates through care and treatment.
Top-down containment won’t work well without
bottom-up cooperation. Wuhan in comparison to
Milan and Lombardy illustrates the importance of
communities’ and residents’ responses relative to
top-down containment measures in local contexts.
For Wuhan, the total lockdown and its rigid
enforcement caught many communities and residents off guard and initially in shock. Communities
were figuring out how to operationalise government restrictions on movement. Some residents
were concerned about whether the virus could be
contained and how to obtain food and medicine.
With the lockdown imposed right before the Chinese
New Year, many families had already purchased
and stored a certain amount of basic food items,
such as cooking oil, rice and meat. In cooperation
with municipal and district governments, community-level administrative units organised people
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living in high-rise towers of residential compounds
(xiao qu) into large WeChat groups of up to 1,000
residents. WeChat also allowed health authorities
to use a green QR code on people’s cell phones to
verify people’s health status regarding COVID-19
and moving around locally, and later nationally after
the lockdown was lifted on 8 April. The legacy of
state-owned enterprises and agencies as work units
(danwei) was reactivated to help organise these
virtual groups. They became the primary mechanism for sharing mass communication and medical
information, recording the daily temperature,
assisting the administration of testing, and placing
orders for deliverable groceries.19 While the municipal and district governments assigned officials to
help neighbourhoods deliver groceries, community volunteers, including younger retirees, played a
stronger role in enforcing lockdown regulations and
responding to residents’ daily needs.
In Milan and the Lombardy region, initial
community and individual responses were coloured
by the health authorities’ early underestimation
of COVID-19 as a normal flu. The quarantine of
Lombardy and other northern regions on 8 March
woke most people up to the COVID-19 threat.
Many tried to take trains out of Milan, despite travel
restrictions. This exodus also reflected the fact that a
good number of people in Milan and Lombardy were
off-site students or workers who wanted to return
to their families, even though it could spread the
virus to more people. The public response became
more accepting as the regional quarantines were
extended to other parts of the country. A Milan resident’s expression of being responsible for self and
others20 reflected a broader public acceptance of the
quarantine. According to a nationally representative
survey of 3,452 Italian adults between 18 and 20
March, nearly 100% of the respondents endorsed
four recommended public health measures: handshake avoidance (95.2%), social gathering avoidance
(94.7%), non-essential activities curfew (93.1%) and

non-essential-shop closure (89.0%).21 Regarding
masks, the government issued a series of guidelines from the end of February to 4 May, when
it became compulsory to wear masks nationally.
While not intentional, this phased approach gave
people incremental time to overcome the original refusal and the lack of a tradition of wearing
masks. Different from and yet similar to Wuhan
and Hubei, people in northern Italy and nationally adapted to the gradual and less restrictive
quarantine as the government messaging sank
in and the gloomy reality of more deaths set in.
The Wuhan case demonstrates a quick and
complete communal and individual acceptance of
the lockdown. The top-down control was met and
absorbed by cooperation from and between the
subordinated community and collectively minded
residents living in a denser and more-managed
residential environment. This still left enough
space for informal responses from some WeChatlinked groups within and outside residential blocks
to provide help. These groups, often run by volunteers, could helped isolated residents secure food,
medicine and other supplies. They also provided
emotional support, with members trading recipes
and virtual workouts.22 Since the intra-city public
transport system was shut down, a small number
of young volunteers with their own cars drove
doctors and nurses to their hospitals and delivered
emergency medicine to elderly residents.
In Milan, the “Voluntary Emergency
Brigades”, a grassroots initiative in partnership
with the municipal government and the Italian
NGO Emergency, organised young people to

As two of the
hardest-hit cities,
Wuhan and Milan
have gone through
a lot of pain,
with the loss of
thousands of their
residents and the
shattering of their
local economies
and urban life.

Masses resumed as Italy
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bring groceries and medicines to infected people
in quarantine, especially the elderly and other
vulnerable people. Many of the project’s 300
volunteers were students or young people who
had lost their jobs and used their unfortunate idle
time to help those in need.23 In Lombardy, priests,
who are central to Italian communal life, stepped
up as the spiritual pillar of the affected communities and families. They risked, and sometimes
gave, their lives in attending to the spiritual needs
of the often older and devout Italians hardest hit
by the virus. Bergamo, a smaller city not far from
Milan but hit harder, lost 24 priests in 20 days.
During their risky visits to hospital wards or family
homes, the priests delivered last rites through
WhatsApp to the dying, at hospital bedsides
and outside family bedrooms.24 In different and
similar ways, the two cases confirm that the
government responses through rigid lockdown
or loose quarantine would have worked less well
without adaptive and cooperative community and
individual initiatives.
3. Lessons for Urban Governance and
Sustainability
As two of the hardest-hit cities, Wuhan and Milan
have gone through a lot of pain, with the loss of
thousands of their residents and the shattering of
their local economies and urban life. The empty
and eerie streets during Wuhan’s 76-day (23
January-8 April) lockdown and Milan’s 72-day (8
March-18 May) quarantine have etched into the
memories of their residents. While both cities
have recently reopened, their slow return to a new
normal begs the big question of what COVID-19
reveals about the governance and resilience of
large and dense cities.
Cities do not and cannot combat and beat
a global pandemic by themselves. Wuhan and
Milan have proved it, and so has New York
more recently as another pandemic epicentre.
In dealing with the unprecedented crisis posed
by COVID-19, different cities can expect and
receive different assistances, given their national
and global contexts. Wuhan can expect and has
received massive medical and financial support
from the national government. This outside
help has also included horizontal assistance in
medical teams from all provinces and major cities.
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The other hard-hit cities near Wuhan also obtained
targeted infusion of medical resources from Beijing
and other provinces. This alleviated the financial
burden of Hubei province that otherwise would
have had to relieve cities under its administration.
The government also paid all testing and treatment
expenses for Wuhan’s residents and patients. These
massive and expensive government measures added
up to what turned out to be a won “people’s war”
against the coronavirus. The victory has been touted
with a repeated reference to Wuhan as a “heroic city”.
The uneven cross-city effort in China to contain
SARS in 2003 offered a historical lesson for fighting
COVID-19 with a coordinated national campaign.
The wealthiest region of Italy, with considerable
economic autonomy, Milan and Lombardy have
received little direct help from the national government, despite being hardest hit. Although Italy was the
first and hardest-hit country in the European Union, it
received little early assistance from other EU members.
Only later did Germany accept 47 COVID patients
from Italy, while it also stopped 800,000 surgical
masks shipped from China en route to Italy.25
Whether extra-local help comes or not, crisisstricken cities need strong local leadership during
and after a major crisis. Yet municipal leadership is
accountable to both higher authorities and local residents differently in different systems. In the Chinese
context, the central government replaced both the
Party Secretaries of Hubei province and Wuhan
on 13 February for under-reporting and incompetence in the early stage of the pandemic. The new
municipal and provincial leaders immediately introduced a new governance system, deploying many
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officials to the neighbourhood level to monitor and
enforce the lockdown. This was critical in bringing
the pandemic under speedy control. On 10-11
May, when six new COVID cases were discovered
in a district of Wuhan, the municipal leadership
removed the district’s Party Secretary for negligence
and slow response. This small relapse prompted the
municipal government to instruct all district authorities to test all 11 million residents across Wuhan’s
13 districts in 10 days, despite its daunting execution
and cost. With 67% of all the COVID cases concentrated in its dense urban core (see Table 1), Wuhan
can use the recovery to accelerate its long-term plan
for creating six sub-centres of high-tech-led development and its induced urban living in the city’s
much less crowded outer districts.26
Milan has had a strong mayor at the head of the
city council since 1993. In responding to COVID19, Mayor Giuseppe Sala has exercised a strong and
steady hand. When Milanese continued to congregate
around Navigli, a popular area for people to enjoy
traditional afternoon drinks (aperitivo) and dinners,
even after the quarantine, Mayor Sala publicly
threatened to close the entire area. In planning for
post-COVID recovery and redevelopment, Mayor
Sala has decided to reallocate 35 km of road space
previously used by cars to bikes and pedestrians. A
new 30-km-per-hour speed limit aims to make traffic
more fluid and give pedestrians more space to spread
out safely.27 These measures are part of Milan’s
post-pandemic effort to fast-track key elements
of the Milan 2035 Master Plan for implementation
by 2025. Unlike in China, however, Milan’s mayor
faces far more constraints from competitive political parties and diverse civil groups in using bold and
aggressive policy tools to counter an unprecedented
crisis like COVID-19. The pandemic has also cast a
spotlight on cross-border policy mobility in urban
governance and responses to a major public health
crisis. Similar to what Milan has done but with a
more aggressive twist, the Mayor of London, Sadiq
Khan, and Transport for London have announced
plans to turn parts of central London into one of
the largest car-free zones in any large and dense
city in the world. We can also trace forward the
Fangcang shelter hospital converted from Wuhan’s
Convention Centre to the temporary use of Milan’s
Expo Centre and New York’s Javits Centre as makeshift hospitals for COVID patients.

Source: Photos by EPA/Jiji and Xinhua/AP, Nikkei Montage, April 9, 2020; accessed from https://asia.
nikkei.com/Editor-s-Picks/China-up-close/Wuhan-liberated-but-Xi-s-virus-victory-day-remains-elusive.

COVID-19 has woken up large and dense cities to improve their governance
capacities, strengthen their pre-pandemic public health infrastructure and
conduct a new round of planning, or refine their exit plans in full recognition of
their national and global advantages and constraints exposed by COVID-19.
Finally, there is an opportunity in any crisis, as implied
by the two Chinese characters (危机) making up the English
word “crisis”. COVID-19 has woken up large and dense
cities to improve their governance capacities, strengthen their
pre-pandemic public health infrastructure and conduct a new
round of planning, or refine their exit plans in full recognition
of their national and global advantages and constraints exposed
by COVID-19. If this happens, the world’s greatest cities, like
Wuhan and Milan, will not only survive this pandemic but also
thrive in a more sustainable post-COVID urban world.
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